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Note
ASTRUE v. CAPATO: RELEGATING POSTHUMOUSLY
CONCEIVED CHILDREN TO SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS
NICOLE M. BARNARD ∗
[I]mposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the
basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no
child is responsible for his birth . . . . 1
2
In Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court of the United States ex3
amined the status of posthumously conceived children under the
4
survivor insurance benefits provision of the Social Security Act (“the
Act”). The Court upheld the Social Security Administration’s (“SSA”)
interpretation of the provisions of the Act that allow state intestacy law
to determine whether a posthumously conceived child qualifies as a
“child” under the Act and, therefore, is eligible to receive federal sur-
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1. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
2. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
3. A posthumously conceived child is a child who is conceived through the use of
assisted reproductive technology “after the death of a genetic parent.” Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. & Maureen McBrien, Posthumous Reproduction, 39 FAM. L.Q. 579, 581 (2005).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301–1397mm (2006); Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2027. The survivor child’s
insurance benefits provision of the Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 402(d).
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5

vivor benefits. The Court reasoned that such an interpretation was
consistent with the statute’s textual meaning and purpose, passed inspection under the rational basis test, and was entitled to judicial def6
erence.
In so holding, the Court failed to protect the rights of a unique
class of citizens. The Court improperly distinguished posthumously
conceived children from other illegitimate children who are protected under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause
7
of the Fifth Amendment. Instead, the Court should have remanded
the case to allow the parties to present evidence on the question of
whether posthumously conceived children represent a different subcategory of illegitimate children not entitled to intermediate scruti8
ny. By failing to do so, the Supreme Court improperly applied rational basis review and found that the SSA’s interests for deferring to
9
state intestacy law were legitimate. As a result, the Court upheld a
policy by the SSA that applied state intestacy laws without limitation to
a previously protected class, thereby failing to protect this vulnerable
10
segment of society. The Court should have followed its own precedent and applied intermediate scrutiny to this discriminatory policy so
that posthumously conceived children receive equal protection under
11
the law.
I. THE CASE
In August 1999, shortly after Robert and Karen Capato married,
Mr. Capato was diagnosed with cancer. 12 Mr. Capato deposited his
semen in a sperm bank because the couple wanted to have children

5. 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2), (h)(3)(C); Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026.
6. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026, 2033.
7. See infra Part IV.A. For a detailed explanation of why posthumously conceived
children are properly classified as “illegitimate,” see infra notes 161−168, 173−178 and accompanying text.
8. See infra Part IV.B.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
10. See infra Part IV.D.
11. See infra Part IV.D.
12. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 627 (3d Cir.
2011), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).

2013]

ASTRUE v. CAPATO

1041
13

but feared that cancer treatments could cause sterility.
Notwithstanding Mr. Capato’s cancer treatments, Mrs. Capato conceived nat14
urally, giving birth to a son in August 2001. The Capatos desired a
15
sibling for their son, but Mr. Capato died in March 2002.
At the time of his death, Mr. Capato was a Florida resident and
16
had executed a will in Florida. Mr. Capato’s will named his son, who
was born to Karen Capato in August 2001, and two other children
17
from a previous marriage as beneficiaries. The will did not contain a
18
provision for posthumously conceived children.
Shortly after Mr. Capato died, Mrs. Capato underwent in vitro
19
fertilization (“IVF”) treatments using Mr. Capato’s frozen sperm. In
January 2003, Mrs. Capato became pregnant and, in September 2003,
eighteen months after Mr. Capato’s death, Mrs. Capato gave birth to
20
twins.
One month later, Mrs. Capato applied for survivor insurance
benefits from the SSA on behalf of the twins, but the SSA denied her
21
claims. On reconsideration, the SSA again denied Mrs. Capato’s
22
claims. An administrative law judge, hearing the evidence de novo,

13. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Astrue, Civ. No. 08-5405 (DMC), 2010 WL 1076522,
at *1–2 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Capato ex rel. B.N.C.,
K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011).
14. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026 (2012).
15. Id.
16. Id.; Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 627.
17. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 627–28.
18. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. Specifically, Mr. Capato’s will distributed his tangible
personal property to Mrs. Capato, “and then to any of his children who survive him.” Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 2010 WL 1076522, at *2.
19. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026. There is a discrepancy as to whether Mrs. Capato conceived through artificial insemination or through in vitro fertilization. Compare Capato ex
rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 2010 WL 1076522, at *3 (stating that “[Mrs. Capato] underwent artificial insemination treatments in Florida”), with Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 628
(stating that “Ms. Capato began in vitro fertilization using the frozen sperm of her husband”).
20. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 2010 WL 1076522, at *3. The twins were Mr. Capato’s
biological children. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 630.
21. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2026; Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 628.
22. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 2010 WL 1076522, at *1.
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23

also denied the claims.
A year later in 2008, the SSA’s Appeals
24
Council denied Mrs. Capato’s request for review.
After exhausting the administrative appeals process, Mrs. Capato
filed a lawsuit against the Commissioner of Social Security, Michael J.
Astrue, in the United States District Court for the District of New Jer25
sey. The district court affirmed the SSA’s final decision finding that
26
the Capato twins were not “children” within the meaning of the Act.
27
The district court reasoned that under 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A), a
decedent’s posthumously conceived child qualifies for survivor insurance benefits only if the child can inherit as an heir under state intes28
tacy law. The district court concluded that the Capato twins did not
qualify as children under Florida’s inheritance laws because they were
29
conceived after Mr. Capato’s death. Thus, the Capato twins were
30
deemed ineligible for Social Security survivor benefits.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit af31
firmed in part and vacated in part. The Third Circuit noted that

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at *4–5.
27. The provision for determining whether an applicant for survivor benefits is a child
of the insured reads as follows:
In determining whether an applicant is the child . . . of a fully or currently insured individual for purposes of this subchapter, the Commissioner of Social Security shall apply such law as would be applied in determining the devolution of
intestate personal property by the courts of the State in which such insured individual is domiciled at the time such applicant files application, or, if such insured
individual is dead, by the courts of the State in which he was domiciled at the
time of his death, or, if such insured individual is or was not so domiciled in any
State, by the courts of the District of Columbia. Applicants who according to
such law would have the same status relative to taking intestate personal property
as a child . . . shall be deemed such.
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(A) (2006). To maintain consistency with the Supreme Court and
lower court opinions in Capato, this Note uses “§ 402” and “§ 416” to refer to subsections of
Title 42 of the United States Code, not to subsections of the individual Social Security Act.
28. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 2010 WL 1076522, at *5.
29. Id. at *6–7.
30. Id. at *5, *7.
31. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 628 & n.1, 632
(3d Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
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§ 416(h) was relevant only “where a claimant’s status as a deceased
32
wage-earner’s child is in doubt.” The court reasoned that the plain
33
language of § 416(e) is clear as to the definition of “child,” and that
neither § 416(h) nor state intestacy law needs to be considered in situations involving the “undisputed biological children of a deceased
34
wage earner and his widow.” Accordingly, the Third Circuit concluded that the Capato twins were children within the meaning of the
Act’s survivor insurance benefits provision and required an evaluation
of dependency to determine whether the twins were entitled to Social
35
Security survivor insurance benefits.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict
among the federal circuit courts of appeal regarding the status of
posthumously conceived children under the Act’s survivor insurance
36
benefits provision.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Since the Social Security Amendments of 1939, Congress has
recognized the need to provide survivor insurance benefits to certain
37
family members, including children. Legitimacy of birth has played
a significant part in determinations of which children receive these
38
benefits. The nation’s highest court has, for nearly half a century,
recognized the need to protect illegitimate children, one of the most
vulnerable populations, from the often harsh and unforgiving policies
39
of state and local governments. More recently, lower courts have
differed on how to handle situations involving entitlement to benefits
and the development of fertility technology, namely a new subcatego-

32. Id. at 631.
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 416(e) (2006) (defining the term “child” under the Act).
34. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 631–32.
35. Id. at 632. Applying reasoning from Ninth Circuit’s decision in Vernoff v. Astrue,
568 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2009), the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the Capatos’ equal protection claim. Id. at 628 n.1 (“Such a classification does not
violate Equal Protection laws because it is reasonably related to the government’s interest
in assuring that survivor benefits reach children who depended on the support of a wageearner and lost that support due to the wage-earner’s death.”).
36. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2027 (2012).
37. See infra Part II.A.
38. See infra Part II.A.
39. See infra Part II.B.
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ry of illegitimate children who are conceived using IVF after the death
40
of one parent.
A. The Social Security Act
During the Great Depression, President Franklin D. Roosevelt
signed the Social Security Act into law. 41 Initially, the Act created a
“social insurance program” designed to provide retired workers with
42
an income after retirement. Congress amended the Act in 1939,
adding survivor insurance benefits for certain family members of cov43
ered workers who had died. Beneficiaries under this provision in44
cluded widows, children, and the insured’s parents. The purpose of
the Act and the dependent benefits provision was to provide support
for the dependants of a disabled or deceased worker and to relieve
45
some of the burdens of life. Courts have since interpreted the Act as
46
a remedial statute intended to serve humanitarian aims.
Today, to be eligible for survivor insurance benefits under the
Act, a child applicant of a deceased insured worker must prove that

40. See infra Part II.C.
41. Pub. L. No. 74-271, ch. 531, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 301–1397mm (2006)); Historical Background and Development of Social Security, SOC.
SECURITY ADMIN., http://www.ssa.gov/history/briefhistory3.html (last visited Mar. 4,
2013).
42. Historical Background and Development of Social Security, supra note 41; see also § 702,
49 Stat. at 636 (“The [Social Security] Board . . . shall also have the duty of studying and
making recommendations as to the most effective methods of providing economic security
through social insurance . . . .”).
43. Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-379, § 202, 53 Stat. 1360,
1363–67 (1939) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006)).
44. § 202(b)–(e), 53 Stat. at 1362–66.
45. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 633–34 (1974); Graham v. Barnhart, 278 F.
Supp. 2d 1251, 1262–63 (D. Kan. 2003).
46. See, e.g., Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 629 (3d
Cir. 2011) (acknowledging the need for a liberal application of the Act in light of “‘its remedial and humanitarian aims’” (citation omitted), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel.
B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012); Dorsey v. Bowen, 828 F.2d 246, 248 (4th Cir. 1987) (“The
Social Security Act is a remedial statute, to be broadly construed and liberally applied in
favor of beneficiaries.”); see also Acierno v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 77, 81 (2d Cir. 2007) (same);
Cohen v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 531 (6th Cir. 1992)
(same); Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1979) (same); Eisenhauer v. Mathews,
535 F.2d 681, 686 (2d Cir. 1976) (same).
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he: (1) meets the Act’s definition of a “child” and (2) is dependent on
47
the insured parent. Whether an applicant qualifies as a child under
the Act depends on the applicant’s relationship to the insured. In §
416(e), the Act broadly defines a child as “the child or legally adopted
48
child of an individual.” The Act asserts in § 416(h)(2)(A), however,
that state intestacy law determines if an applicant is a child under the
49
Act. The SSA has required applicants to satisfy both § 416(e) and
50
§ 416(h) to secure the status of a child under the Act. Regarding
the dependency requirement, children who are considered legitimate
51
are presumed dependent. When a child is not considered legitimate, however, the child must attempt to prove dependency because
there is no parallel presumption of dependency for illegitimate chil52
dren.

47. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1) (2006); 20 C.F.R. § 404.350 (2012).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 416(e)(1) (2006).
49. Id. § 416(h)(2)(A). The Act also provides additional ways for an applicant to qualify as a child eligible to receive survivorship benefits, which include the following: (1) if the
insured and the other parent “went through a marriage ceremony resulting in a purported
marriage between them which, but for a legal impediment . . . would have been a valid
marriage”; (2) if a deceased insured individual, before death, “(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant [wa]s his or her son or daughter, (II) had been decreed . . . to be
the mother or father of the applicant, or (III) had been ordered . . . to contribute to the
support of the applicant”; or (3) if the deceased insured individual “is shown . . . to have
been the mother or father of the applicant, and such insured individual was living with or
contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured individual died.” 42
U.S.C. § 416 (h)(2)(B), (h)(3)(C)(i)–(ii) (2006). The SSA noted in an acquiescence ruling that “[t]hese additional tests for eligibility require action by the insured during the
lifetime of the child.” SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 n.3 (Sept. 22, 2005).
50. See, e.g., Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 52−53 (4th Cir. 2011) (“On the SSA’s view,
§ 416(h) ‘provides the analytical framework that [it] must follow for determining whether
a child is the insured’s child’ for purposes of § 416(e)(1)’s definition.” (alteration in original)), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012).
51. See, e.g., Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 635 (1974) (noting that legitimate
children are “by statute ‘deemed dependent’”).
52. Id. at 635. For example, a natural child whose mother or father did not marry the
insured individual may be entitled to benefits if “the insured was either living with [the
applicant] or contributing to [his] support at the time [he] applied for benefits” or, in the
case of an “insured [who] is not alive at the time of [the applicant’s] application, [if the
applicant] ha[s] evidence to show that the insured was either living with [him] or contributing to [his] support when he or she died.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.355 (2012).
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In the case of a posthumously conceived child, an applicant’s eligibility to inherit under state intestacy law is dispositive to determining whether the posthumously conceived child is eligible for Social
53
Security survivor insurance benefits. If a posthumously conceived
child is considered legitimate under state intestacy law, then the child
qualifies as a child under the Act, is presumed dependent, and is eli54
gible for survivor insurance benefits. If, however, the posthumously
conceived child is illegitimate under state intestacy law, the child is
not even considered a “child” under the Act and, thus, cannot receive
55
the benefits. In effect, the SSA incorporates a state’s definition of a
child when determining the inheritance rights of a posthumously
conceived child seeking survivor insurance benefits.
B. Establishing Intermediate Scrutiny for Classifications Based on
Illegitimacy
Since the early 1970s, the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has steadily progressed toward establishing intermediate
scrutiny for classifications based on illegitimacy. In Weber v. Aetna
56
Casualty and Surety Co., the Supreme Court struck down a Louisiana
state law that set different standards for legitimate and illegitimate
children to obtain worker’s compensation benefits after the death of a
57
The Court stated that the law relegated dependent but
parent.
“unacknowledged illegitimates” to a lower status than that afforded to
58
59
legitimate children. Applying a form of intermediate scrutiny, the

53. See, e.g., Schafer, 641 F.3d at 53 (noting that “[t]o meet the definition of ‘child’ under the Act, an after-conceived child must be able to inherit under State law” (citation
omitted)).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402 (d)(1),(3), 416(e), (h) (2006).
55. Cf. SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 (Sept. 22, 2005) (“A child who cannot inherit personal property from the deceased insured individual under State intestacy
law may nonetheless be eligible for child’s insurance benefits under limited circumstances
under sections 216(h)(2)(B) and (3)(C); these circumstances do not apply to an afterconceived child. Consequently, to meet the definition of ‘‘child’’ under the Act, an afterconceived child must be able to inherit under State law.”).
56. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
57. Id. at 165, 167−69.
58. Id. at 169−70.
59. Intermediate scrutiny assesses whether a law serves an “important governmental
objective” and whether the law is substantially related to achieving that goal. Clark v. Jeter,
486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988).
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Court concluded that this lower status bore “no significant relationship” to the State’s interests of promoting family relationships and
60
minimizing problems of proof of parentage. The Supreme Court
reasoned that condemning a child for the actions of the parents was
61
“illogical and unjust.”
Two years later, the Supreme Court affirmed Weber’s use of intermediate scrutiny for legitimacy-based classifications. In Jimenez v.
62
Weinberger, the Court addressed an equal protection challenge based
on the Act’s different dependency standards for legitimate and illegit63
imate children. Jimenez dealt with the denial of disability benefits to
two illegitimate children who were born out of wedlock after the onset of their parent’s disability. The Jimenez Court, applying a form of
intermediate scrutiny, determined that the nonlegitimated illegitimate children were deprived of equal protection because both classifications of illegitimate children, legitimated and nonlegitimated,
were similarly situated and posed the same potential to generate spu64
rious claims. The Court explained that the subclassifications within
the Act’s illegitimate children classification, which included those
children who were presumed dependent due to state intestacy law
and those who were not, were both overinclusive and underinclusive
and, thus, were unconstitutional because they barred recovery for il65
legitimate children born after the onset of the parental disability.
66
Shortly thereafter, in Mathews v. Lucas, the Supreme Court
again addressed the constitutionality of the Act’s dependency provisions under the equal protection component of the Due Process
67
Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court acknowledged that the
dependency presumptions in the Act resulted in the different treatment of similarly situated classes of children—legitimate and illegiti-

60. Weber, 406 U.S. at 172–73, 175−76.
61. Id. at 175–76.
62. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
63. Id. at 631, 634–37.
64. Id. at 632, 635−37.
65. See id. at 637 (“[T]he two subclasses of illegitimates stand on equal footing, and
the potential for spurious claims is the same as to both; hence to conclusively deny one
subclass benefits presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment.”).
66. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
67. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Mathews, 427 U.S. at 497, 502.
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mate. The Mathews Court was not clear as to the level of scrutiny it
applied, but the Court still found that the classifications, which excluded a subclass of illegitimate children, were reasonably related to
the government interest of administrative convenience and the likeli69
hood of dependency.
In the cases that followed, the Supreme Court regularly applied
intermediate scrutiny to determine inheritance rights for illegitimate
70
children. For example, in Trimble v. Gordon, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of an Illinois law that allowed an illegitimate child to
inherit under state intestacy law only from his mother and not from
71
By contrast, Illinois intestacy law allowed a legitimate
his father.
72
child to inherit from both his mother and his father. Following its
73
precedent regarding illegitimacy-based classifications, the Supreme
Court applied intermediate scrutiny and deemed the Illinois law un74
constitutional.
68. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 507–09.
69. See id. at 509–10 (“[W]e think that the statutory classifications challenged here are
justified as reasonable empirical judgments that are consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon a child’s dependency at the time of the parent’s death.”). The
Court rejected applying either strict scrutiny or toothless rational basis review. Cf. id.
(“Under the standard of review applicable here . . . the materiality of the relation between
the statutory classifications and the likelihood of dependency they assertedly reflect need
not be ‘scientifically substantiated.’ . . . [T]he scrutiny . . . is not a toothless one.” (citations omitted)). In dissent, Justice Stevens highlighted the Court’s failure to explain the
applicable level of scrutiny. See id. at 519–20 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[A]n admittedly
illogical and unjust result should not be accepted without both a better explanation and
also something more than a ‘possibly rational’ basis.”). Justice Stevens also opined that the
dependency presumptions violated equal protection because administrative convenience
did not justify the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of the Act’s classifications regarding the presumption of dependency. Id. at 517–23 (“[I]n the name of ‘administrative
convenience’ the Court allows these survivors’ benefits to be allocated on grounds which
have only the most tenuous connection to the supposedly controlling factor—the child’s
dependency on his father.”).
70. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
71. Id. at 763–65.
72. Id. at 763.
73. See id. at 766 n.11 (listing a line of cases and noting that “[the instant] case represents the 12th time since 1968 that [the Court] ha[s] considered the constitutionality of
alleged discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy”).
74. See id. at 762, 769–71 (“Despite the conclusion that classifications based on illegitimacy fall in a ‘realm of less than strictest scrutiny,’ . . . the scrutiny ‘is not a toothless
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Likewise, in Clark v. Jeter, 75 the Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of a Pennsylvania law that contained two different
sets of requirements for a child to receive support from his father
76
based on the child’s legitimacy status. For an illegitimate child to
receive support, the Pennsylvania law required the child to (1) “prove
paternity before seeking support from his or her father” and (2) file
“a suit to establish paternity . . . within six years of [the] child’s
77
birth.” A legitimate child, by contrast, could seek support from his
father at any time, without the requirements placed on an illegitimate
78
child. Applying intermediate scrutiny, the Court unanimously concluded that the Pennsylvania law violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because “the 6-year statute of limitations [wa]s not substantially related to [the state’s] interest in avoid79
ing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims.” Thus, by the late
1980s, the Supreme Court had clearly established its reliance on intermediate scrutiny to evaluate illegitimacy-based classifications.
C. Posthumously Conceived Children and Their Rights to Social Security
Survivor Insurance Benefits
The line of cases from the 1970s to 1980s that addressed claims
involving illegitimate children did not consider the issue of posthu80
mously conceived children. Today, thanks to advancements in med-

one,’ . . . .” (citations omitted)). In dissent, Justice Rehnquist noted that the majority of
the Court’s equal protection cases involving illegitimacy-based classifications applied a
heightened scrutiny that was more searching than that applied to other laws that regulated
economic and social conditions. See id. at 781–86 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (critiquing
the majority’s standard of scrutiny application and writing that “[t]he appropriate ‘scrutiny,’ in the eyes of the Court, appears to involve some analysis of the relation of the ‘purpose’ of the legislature to the ‘means’ by which it chooses to carry out that purpose.”). Of
the seven cases that Justice Rehnquist cited, he noted that only one outlier case, Mathews v.
Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976), failed to apply heightened scrutiny. Id.
75. 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
76. Id. at 457.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 457, 461, 463−65.
80. See, e.g., id. at 457−58 (addressing claims of a child conceived and born during the
lifetime of both parents); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763−64 (1977) (same);
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 497 (1976) (same); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628,
630 (1974) (same); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 165 (1972) (addressing

1050

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1039

ical technology and the use of IVF, posthumously conceived children
are a reality. As a result, cases that center on the ability of posthumously conceived children to inherit from their deceased parent(s)
81
have appeared in state courts. Within the last decade, cases addressing the eligibility of posthumously conceived children to receive Social Security survivor insurance benefits have surfaced in federal
82
court. During this brief time period, a circuit court split developed
regarding the role of state intestacy law in defining a “child” under
the Act.
1.

Initial State Court Cases Regarding the Inheritance Rights of
Posthumously Conceived Children

83
In re Estate of Kolacy was the first notable case that addressed
posthumously conceived children in the context of Social Security
survivor benefits. In November 1996, more than eighteen months after William J. Kolacy died, his wife gave birth to twins who were conceived through IVF using sperm that Mr. Kolacy had deposited in a
84
sperm bank. Mrs. Kolacy filed for Social Security survivor insurance
85
benefits on behalf of the twins. The SSA denied the request, indicating that under New Jersey intestacy law, the twins were not considered
86
children of the deceased. The Superior Court of New Jersey, however, granted declaratory relief, concluding that the posthumously

claims of one illegitimate child born during the parents’ lifetime and a second child conceived during the parents’ lifetime, but born after the father’s death); see also In re Estate of
Kolacy, 753 A.2d 1257, 1260 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (“I have not been able to find
any American appellate court decisions dealing with th[e] central issue” of intestacy rights
of posthumously conceived children).
81. See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 259 (Mass. 2002); In re
Kolacy, 753 A.2d at 1258−60.
82. See, e.g., Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2679 (2012); Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 50−51 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct.
2680 (2012); Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir. 2009); Gillett-Netting v.
Barnhart, 371 F.3d 593, 594−95 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C.,
132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
83. 753 A.2d 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000).
84. Id. at 1258.
85. Id. at 1259.
86. Id.
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conceived twins were Mr. Kolacy’s legal heirs under New Jersey intes87
tacy law.
In 2002, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts addressed
88
a similar issue in Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security. In 1995,
two years after her husband died, Lauren Woodward gave birth to
twin girls conceived through artificial insemination using her hus89
band’s preserved sperm. Similar to the wife in Kolacy, Mrs. Woodward sought Social Security survivor insurance benefits on behalf of
90
the twins, which the SSA denied. Answering a question certified to it
91
by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts,
the Woodward court concluded that, under Massachusetts law, the
twins did not have intestacy rights because there was no evidence that
their father “affirmatively consented (1) to posthumous reproduction
92
and (2) to support any resulting child.” To make this determination, however, the court established a balancing test that considered
“three powerful State interests: the best interests of children, the
State’s interest in the orderly administration of estates, and the re93
productive rights of the genetic parent.” Noting that “posthumously
94
conceived children are always nonmarital children,” the court also
proclaimed that all children are entitled to the same rights, including
the right to support from their parents’ estates, “regardless of the ac-

87. Id. at 1263–64. The court indicated that once paternity is established, a child
“should routinely [be] grant[ed] . . . the legal status of being an heir of the decedent, unless doing so would unfairly intrude on the rights of other persons or would cause serious
problems in terms of the orderly administration of estates.” Id. at 1262. The court, however, did not reach the issue of entitlement to Social Security survivor insurance benefits.
Id. at 1258 (noting that “it is appropriate for me to interpret New Jersey statutory law as it
applies to [the Kolacy twins]” but that “[t]he ultimate question of whether [the twins] are
entitled to Social Security benefits is something which is exclusively a matter for federal
tribunals.”).
88. 760 N.E.2d 257 (Mass. 2002).
89. Id. at 260.
90. Id. at 260–61.
91. Id. at 261 (“The United States District Court judge certified the above question to
this court because ‘[t]he parties agree that a determination of these children’s rights under the law of Massachusetts is dispositive of the case and . . . no directly applicable Massachusetts precedent exists.’” (alterations in original)).
92. Id. at 270–72.
93. Id. at 264–66.
94. Id. at 266–67.
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cidents of their birth.” In arriving at its ultimate conclusion, however, the court acknowledged that “the best interests of the posthumously conceived child, while of great importance, are not in themselves conclusive,” in part because “[a]ny inheritance rights of
posthumously conceived children will reduce the intestate share
96
available to children born prior to the decedent’s death.”
2. Inconsistency Among Federal Circuits Regarding Posthumously
Conceived Children’s Eligibility to Receive Survivor Insurance
Benefits
A pivotal moment regarding the rights of posthumously conceived children and their eligibility for Social Security survivor insurance benefits occurred when the Ninth Circuit decided Gillett-Netting
97
v. Barnhart. In 1996, after Rhonda Gillett-Netting gave birth to twins
who were posthumously conceived following her husband’s death,
98
Mrs. Gillett-Netting filed for child survivor benefits on their behalf.
99
The SSA denied her claim. On judicial review of the SSA’s final determination, the United States District Court for the District of Arizona concluded that because the twins did not qualify as children under
Arizona intestacy law and they could not prove dependency on the
100
Addressing
deceased insured, the SSA properly denied benefits.
Mrs. Gillett-Netting’s equal protection claims, the district court applied rational basis review, reasoning that no suspect or quasi-suspect
class was involved in the classification of distinguishing between biological children in existence at the time of the insured’s death and
101
those not in existence at that time. The district court then rejected
Mrs. Gillett-Netting’s equal protection claim, noting that the SSA rationally relied on state intestacy law and that because the posthumous-

95. Id. at 265.
96. Id. at 266.
97. 371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct.
2021 (2012).
98. Id. at 594–95.
99. See id. (noting that the claim was denied by the SSA and an administrative law
judge and that the Social Security Appeals Council denied a request for review).
100. Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart, 231 F. Supp. 2d 961, 965–67, 970 (D. Ariz. 2002), rev’d,
371 F.3d 593 (9th Cir. 2004), abrogated by Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021
(2012).
101. Id. at 970.
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ly conceived twins could not prove dependency, they were not enti102
tled to Social Security survivor benefits.
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, conclud103
ing that the twins were legitimate children under Arizona law and
were therefore “deemed dependent under § 402(d)(3) and need not
demonstrate actual dependency nor deemed dependency under the
104
The Ninth Circuit, however, never adprovisions of § 416(h).”
105
dressed the equal protection claim.
Following the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in Gillett-Netting, the SSA issued an acquiescence ruling that clarified how the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in Gillett-Netting differed from the SSA’s interpretation of
106
the Act. The SSA explained how it would apply Gillett-Netting in the
Ninth Circuit when determining eligibility for survivor’s benefits of a
child conceived by artificial means after an insured individual’s
107
The SSA observed that “[a]ll of the States and jurisdictions
death.
within the Ninth Circuit, except Guam, have eliminated distinctions
108
The SSA also pointbetween legitimate and illegitimate children.”
102. See id. at 969–70 (“Because Juliet and Piers had not been conceived at the time of
Robert’s death, they are not entitled to survivor’s benefits under the Act. Additionally,
their equal protection rights have not been violated.”).
103. See Gillett-Netting, 371 F.3d at 598 (explaining that Arizona eliminated legitimacybased distinctions to protect innocent children from the actions of their parents). The
Ninth Circuit recognized that “[i]n Arizona, ‘[e]very child is the legitimate child of its
natural parents and is entitled to support and education as if born in lawful wedlock.’” Id.
(quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-601 (2011)).
104. Id. at 599.
105. See id. at 594 n.1 (“Because we conclude that [the twins] are entitled to benefits
under the Act, we do not reach Gillett–Netting’s equal protection claim.”).
106. See generally SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 (Sept. 22, 2005).
107. Id. at 55657; see also id. (“This ruling applies only to cases involving an applicant
for surviving child’s benefits who applies on the earnings record of a person who, at the
time of death, had his permanent home in [the Ninth Circuit,] Alaska, Arizona, California, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Northern Mariana Islands, Oregon, and
Washington.”).
108. Id. The SSA stated that, within the Ninth Circuit, determinations of eligibility for
survivor’s benefits for posthumously conceived children would differ from the determinations used in other circuits:
In a claim for survivor’s benefits, we will determine that a biological child of an
insured individual who was conceived by artificial means after the insured’s
death is the insured’s “child” for purposes of the Act. We will not apply section
216(h) of the Act in determining the child’s status. In addition, if such child is
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ed out that the only way a posthumously conceived child could qualify
as a “child” under the Act was if the child could inherit under state in109
testacy law.
In addition to differences created by the Gillett-Netting decision
and the SSA’s subsequent acquiescence ruling regarding the application of the Act in the Ninth Circuit, a clear circuit court split developed in 2011 over whether posthumously conceived children were eligible for Social Security survivor insurance benefits. On the one
hand, the Third Circuit in Capato ex rel. B.N.C, K.N.C. v. Commissioner
110
of Social Security agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s position regarding
the SSA’s interpretation of the Act and determined that posthumousconsidered legitimate under State law, we will consider the child to be the insured’s “legitimate” child and thus deemed dependent upon the insured for
purposes of section 202(d)(3) of the Act. . . . These States [in the Ninth Circuit]
allow all children the same rights which flow between parents and their children,
regardless of the parents’ marital status. A child acquires these rights if he establishes that an individual is his parent under State family law provisions. Accordingly, if all other requirements are met, adjudicators will consider such child entitled to child’s benefits under section 202(d) [of the Act].
Id.
109. See id. (explaining that “to meet the definition of ‘child’ under the Act, an afterconceived child must be able to inherit under State law”). Indeed, courts have understood
the SSA’s interpretation of the Act to mean that a posthumously conceived child cannot
satisfy the alternative mechanisms for qualifying as a child under the Act found in either
42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(2)(B) or § 416(h)(3)(C). See, e.g., Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v.
Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 631 (3d Cir. 2011) (“An ‘after-conceived’ child, [the
SSA] continued, cannot satisfy the alternative mechanisms in §§ 416(h)(2)(B) and
416(h)(3)(C) . . . . There was no explanation as to why the statute even suggests, much
less compels, that result.”), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021
(2012); see also supra note 49. The SSA also explained that a posthumously conceived child
that is considered legitimate under state law is deemed dependent upon the insured and
need not prove anything else. SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 (Sept. 22, 2005).
The SSA, however, noted that if state law considers a posthumously conceived child illegitimate, then the child must prove dependency by showing that the father was living with
the child or contributing to the child’s support prior to his death, which a posthumously
conceived child cannot show. Cf. id. (“Other children, though, must establish that they
were living with their father at the time of his death or that he was contributing to their
support in order to be found dependent . . . .”).
110. 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011), rev’d sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct.
2021 (2012). For an explanation of Capato ex rel. B.N.C, K.N.C., see supra text accompanying notes 31–35.
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111

ly conceived children were children under the Act.
On the other
112
hand, the Fourth Circuit in Schafer v. Astrue and the Eighth Circuit
113
in Beeler v. Astrue concluded that posthumously conceived children
were not children under the Act and, thus, were not eligible to re114
ceive survivorship benefits.
In Schafer v. Astrue, the Fourth Circuit ruled that posthumously
conceived children were not eligible to collect Social Security survivorship benefits because, under Virginia law, the children did not
115
The Fourth Circuit’s decision, therefore,
qualify as intestate heirs.
116
The court, noting that
upheld the SSA’s interpretation of the Act.
“Congress understood § 416(h)(2)(A)’s intestacy provisions to be the
backbone of all child status determinations,” reasoned that 42 U.S.C.
§ 416(h) was the gateway through which all children had to pass to
117
The court further explained, howevreceive survivorship benefits.
118
er, that in the 1965 Amendments to the Act, Congress had recognized the need to provide a means for illegitimate children to establish child status and “add[ed] § 416(h)(3)(C) so that child status
could also exist where parentage was acknowledged, decreed, implicit
in a contribution order, or proven along with cohabitation or contri111. See Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C., 631 F.3d at 630–32 (“To accept the argument of
the [SSA], one would have to ignore the plain language of § 416(e) and find that the biological child of a married couple is not a ‘child’ within the meaning of § 402(d) unless that
child can inherit under the intestacy laws of the domicile of the decedent. There is no
reason apparent to us why that should be so, and we join the Ninth Circuit in so concluding.”).
112. 641 F.3d 49 (4th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012).
113. 651 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012).
114. Id. at 956, 966; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 50–51, 63. The facts for these cases are similar
in that each dealt with a wife who conceived children through the use of assisted reproduction with her deceased husband’s frozen sperm. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 956–57; Schafer, 641
F.3d at 51. In each case it was undisputed that the deceased husband was the biological
father of the child. Beeler, 651 F.3d at 957; Schafer, 641 F.3d at 51.
115. See Schafer, 641 F.3d at 50–51, 63 (“Virginia intestacy law, as incorporated by the
Act, does render survivorship benefits unavailable here.”). The posthumously conceived
child in Schafer was born almost seven years after his father died. Id. at 51. Virginia law,
however, states that “a child born more than ten months after the death of a parent” cannot inherit intestate. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-164 (2008).
116. Schafer, 641 F.3d at 50–51, 63.
117. Id. at 57.
118. Social Security Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified
as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 6053 and in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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bution.”
Months later, in Beeler v. Astrue, the Eighth Circuit relied
on the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning in Schafer and concluded that the
SSA’s interpretation of the Act was reasonable, thereby solidifying a
120
circuit split.
Although some cases that involve the issue of posthumously conceived children and Social Security survivorship benefits have found
that such children are legitimate under state intestacy law and have
awarded survivor benefits, few cases have addressed the equal protec121
122
In Vernoff v. Astrue, however, the Ninth Circuit
tion argument.
addressed the equal protection argument that the SSA’s interpretation and application of its survivorship provision violated equal protection because the SSA excluded some posthumously conceived
123
children from receiving survivor insurance benefits. The Ninth Circuit opined that the SSA’s interpretation only excluded posthumously
conceived children who did not meet the requirements under state
intestacy law and therefore, because the interpretation did not exclude all posthumously conceived children, Mathews was control124
ling. Following Mathews, the Ninth Circuit applied rational basis re119. Id. at 57–58.
120. See 651 F.3d 954, 956, 962–63 (8th Cir. 2011) (noting the conflict in the circuits
regarding the eligibility of posthumously conceived children to receive Social Security survivorship benefits).
121. Cf. Julie E. Goodwin, Not All Children Are Created Equal: A Proposal to Address Equal
Protection Inheritance Rights of Posthumously Conceived Children, 4 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 234,
235 (2005) (“[T]he few courts and legislatures that have dealt with this issue [whether
posthumously conceived children can inherit from a parent who has died prior to the
child’s conception] have ignored the Equal Protection rights of these posthumously conceived children.”).
122. 568 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2009).
123. Id. at 1112.
124. See id. (“Because the SSA’s interpretation does not exclude all posthumouslyconceived children, we follow the Court’s example in Lucas and apply only rational basis
review”). The Ninth Circuit explained:
In Lucas, the deemed dependency provisions of § 402(d)(3) were challenged because the SSA’s application of those provisions resulted in the extension of benefits only to certain classes of illegitimate children. The Court did not apply
heightened scrutiny, but instead upheld the provisions under rational basis review. Rational basis review was appropriate because the provisions did not draw
a line between legitimate and illegitimate children, but rather included some illegitimate children while excluding others. The Court accepted the SSA’s uncontested view of the purpose of the Act, which “was not a general welfare provi-
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view and determined that the SSA’s interpretation of the Act was constitutional because the classifications were reasonably related to limit125
ing benefits and administrative convenience.
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
judgment of the Third Circuit. 126 The Court concluded that the SSA’s
interpretation of the Act’s survivor insurance benefits provision,
which allowed state intestacy law to determine whether a posthumously conceived child was a child under the Act and eligible to receive
survivor benefits, was consistent with the statute’s textual meaning
127
Accordingly,
and purpose and was entitled to judicial deference.
the Court agreed with the SSA that the Capato twins were not children under the Act and, thus, were not eligible to receive Social Secu128
rity survivor insurance benefits.
Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg rejected the Third Circuit’s conclusion that 42 U.S.C. § 416(h) governs only when a child’s
129
family status is undetermined. Instead, the Court was persuaded by
the SSA’s interpretation of § 416(h) as “a gateway through which all
130
applicants for insurance benefits as a ‘child’ must pass.” The Court
sion for legitimate or otherwise ‘approved’ children of deceased insureds, but
was intended just ‘to replace the support lost by a child when his father . . .
dies . . . .’” The Court concluded that “the statutory classifications are permissible . . . because they are reasonably related to the likelihood of dependency at
death.” Moreover, the dependency presumptions were not impermissibly overinclusive, because they served the reasonable goal of “administrative convenience.”
Id. (internal citations omitted). For a discussion of Mathews, see supra text accompanying
notes 66−69.
125. Id.
126. 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2025, 2034 (2012).
127. See id. at 2026, 2033 (“We conclude that the SSA’s reading is better attuned to the
statute’s text and its design [and] is at least a permissible construction that garners the
Court’s respect . . . .”).
128. Id. at 2029, 2033.
129. Id. at 2029.
130. Id. (“The regulations make clear that the SSA interprets the Act to mean that the
provisions of § 416(h) are the exclusive means by which an applicant can establish ‘child’
status under § 416(e) as a natural child.” (quoting Beeler v. Astrue, 651 F.3d 954, 960 (8th
Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2679 (2012))).
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also rejected the Third Circuit’s conclusion that § 416(e) was dispositive of the benefits eligibility question, and subsequently rejected the
conclusion that the Capato twins were eligible for the survivor insurance benefits simply because they fit the definition of child under
131
The Supreme Court reasoned that “[n]othing in §
§ 416(e).
416(e)’s tautological definition (‘child’ means . . . the child . . . of an
individual) suggests that Congress understood the word ‘child’ to re132
For support, Justice
fer only to the children of married parents.”
Ginsburg offered dictionary definitions of the term “child,” references
to “child” elsewhere in the Act that “expressly limited the category of
children covered to offspring of a marital union,” and other statutes
that “differentiate child of a marriage (‘legitimate child’) from the
133
unmodified term ‘child.’”
The Court then pointed out that § 416(e) does not “indicate that
Congress intended ‘biological parentage’ to be [a] prerequisite to
134
‘child’ status.” Justice Ginsburg noted that when the Act was passed
135
in 1939, a biological relationship could not be scientifically proven.
Further, she reasoned that “a biological parent is not necessarily a
child’s parent under law” and that marriage does not indicate with
136
Moreover, the Court contended that
certainty a child’s parentage.
even if Mrs. Capato’s proposed definition of “child”—the “biological
137
child of married parents” —was correct, it was unclear whether the
posthumously conceived Capato twins would qualify under this definition because, under Florida law, a marriage ends when one spouse
dies, and the Capato twins were conceived after the death of Mr. Ca138
pato.
Next, the Supreme Court explained why the SSA’s interpretation
of the Act’s provision was more persuasive than that of Mrs. Capato.
Addressing Mrs. Capato’s assertion that the use of state intestacy law
was not mentioned in § 416(e) and, therefore, should not apply, Justice Ginsburg reasoned that the text of § 416(h) “explicitly comple131. Id. at 2029.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 2029–30.
134. Id. at 2030.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. (citing Brief for Respondent at 9, Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021
(2012) (No. 11-159)).
138. Id. (“If that [Florida] law applies, . . . the Capato twins . . . would not qualify as
‘marital’ children.”).
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mented” § 416(e), making it unnecessary to place redundant lan139
guage in § 416(e) as to how a child’s status is determined. Thus, the
Court agreed with the SSA that “[r]eliance on state intestacy law to
140
determine who is a ‘child’ . . . serves the Act’s driving objective.”
The Court emphasized that Congress’s “reference to state law to
determine an applicant’s status as a ‘child’” is not an uncommon ap141
To illustrate that point, Justice
proach to defining family status.
Ginsburg pointed out that state law is referenced in other provisions
142
The Court also stated that Congress did not perceive
in the Act.
“the core purpose” of the Act to be the creation of a program to benefit the needy, but rather “to ‘provide . . . dependent members of [a
wage earner’s] family with protection against the hardship occasioned
143
The Court opined that
by [the] loss of [the insured’s] earnings.’”
the SSA’s reliance on state intestacy law to determine whether an ap144
plicant is a child under the Act better serves this purpose. Though
acknowledging that some children who fall “outside the Act’s central
concern” benefit from this interpretation, the Court nevertheless determined that Congress’s regime of using state intestacy law to determine which children were dependent on the insured’s earnings was a
145
workable solution within Congress’s authority.
The Court next rejected Mrs. Capato’s argument that “[t]he
SSA’s construction of the Act raises serious constitutional concerns
146
under the equal protection component of the Due Process Clause.”
The Court observed that this argument had been rejected by several
147
Justice Ginsburg excourts, including the Ninth Circuit in Vernoff.

139. Id. at 2029, 2031.
140. Id. at 2032.
141. Id. at 2031.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 2032 (alterations in original) (quoting Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52
(1977)).
144. Id.
145. See id. (“[T]he intestacy criterion yields benefits to some children outside the Act’s
central concern. . . . It was nonetheless Congress’ prerogative to legislate for the generality of cases. It did so here by employing eligibility to inherit under state intestacy law as a
workable substitute for burdensome case-by-case determinations whether the child was, in
fact, dependent on her father’s earnings.”).
146. Id. at 2033.
147. See id. (citing Vernoff v. Astrue, 568 F.3d 1102, 1112 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting the
Ninth Circuit’s approval of Congress’s regime as being reasonably related to the govern-
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plained that even though there are additional eligibility requirements
for natural children under § 416(h), compared to, for example,
adopted children or stepchildren, that does not necessarily indicate
148
Justice Ginsburg then
an advantage for non-biological children.
stated that the proper level of scrutiny was rational basis review and
determined that Congress’s regime of using state intestacy law was a
149
“workable substitute for burdensome case-by-case determinations.”
Finally, the Supreme Court noted that, despite the fact that the
SSA’s construction of the Act may not be the only reasonable interpretation, it is a rational construction that deserves deference under
150
While
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
the Court acknowledged the tragic circumstances of the case, it nevertheless explained that it could not replace the law that Congress enment’s interests in benefiting children who lose support and reducing administrative burdens). For a discussion of Vernoff, see supra text accompanying notes 122−125.
148. See id. at 2032–33 (“In short, the Act and regulations set different eligibility requirements for adopted children, stepchildren, grandchildren, and stepgrandchildren,
but it hardly follows that applicants in those categories are treated more advantageously
than are children who must meet a § 416(h) criterion.” (internal citation omitted)).
149. Id. at 2033 (“Under rational-basis review, the regime Congress adopted easily passes inspection.” (internal footnote omitted)).
150. Id. at 2026, 2033–34 (“The SSA’s interpretation of the relevant provisions, adhered
to without deviation for many decades, is at least reasonable; the agency’s reading is therefore entitled to this Court’s deference under Chevron.” (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984))). In Capato, the Supreme Court noted
that “Chevron deference is appropriate ‘when it appears that Congress delegated authority
to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority.’” Id. at
2033–24 (quoting United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001)). Under
Chevron, however, even if Congress has not expressly delegated authority to fill in a gap in
a provision, the authority generally conferred to an agency can allow the agency to interpret the provisions of the statute it administers with the force of law. See Chevron, 467 U.S.
at 844−45 (“Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on a particular question is
implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator of
an agency.”). Provided that the agency interpretation is not “arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006), a
reviewing court is obligated to give “legislative regulations . . . controlling weight.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. This has led the Supreme Court to conclude that Chevron deference “has produced a spectrum of judicial responses, from great respect at one end . . . to
near indifference at the other.” Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 228 (citations omitted).
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acted, which determines eligibility for child survivor benefits under
the Act based on state intestacy law, with a judicial mandate that “the
151
statute’s text scarcely supports.”
IV. ANALYSIS
In Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court upheld the SSA’s interpretation of the survivor benefits provision of the Act, thereby allowing state intestacy law to continue to determine whether a posthumously conceived child qualifies as a child under the Act and can
152
With little disreceive Social Security survivor insurance benefits.
cussion regarding the equal protection claim, the Court incorrectly
153
distinguished between two classes of illegitimate children and failed
to remand the case for a determination of whether posthumously
conceived illegitimate children are entitled to the heightened scrutiny
154
As a result, the
usually applied to illegitimacy-based classifications.
Court erred in applying rational basis review to the SSA’s interpretation of the survivor benefits provision and unnecessarily delayed a ruling that would have protected this unique group of illegitimate chil155
The Supreme Court should have honored its equal
dren.
protection precedent regarding illegitimate children and applied in156
Moreover,
termediate scrutiny to these discriminatory measures.
even under rational basis review, the Court should have found that
the SSA’s asserted interests are insufficient to justify denying survivor
157
insurance benefits to these children.
A. The Court Erred in Finding a Distinction Between Posthumously
Conceived Children and Other Illegitimate Children
From a legal and factual perspective, a posthumously conceived
child is an illegitimate child. In Capato, the Court upheld the SSA’s
determination that the posthumously conceived Capato children were
not children under the Act because, under state law, they were not
entitled to an inheritance through intestate succession, thus implying
that the twins were illegitimate children at the time of their actual
151. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2034.
152. See supra Part III.
153. See infra Part IV.A.
154. See infra Part IV.B.
155. See infra Part IV.C.
156. See infra Part IV.D.
157. See infra Part IV.D.2.
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158

birth.
Nonetheless, in addressing Mrs. Capato’s equal protection
claim, the Court was inconsistent in its reasoning that posthumously
conceived children are distinguishable from other illegitimate chil159
This distinction stemmed from an erroneous determination
dren.
that, unlike the stigma suffered by traditional illegitimate children,
there was no indication that posthumously conceived children suf160
fered such a stigma.
1. Posthumously Conceived Children Are Illegitimate Children by
Definition
Historically, the Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase “ille161
gitimate child” to mean any non-marital child. In Capato, the Court
found a distinction between posthumously conceived children and
other illegitimate children based on presumptions regarding different
162
conduct by the parents. The only distinction that can truly be made
between posthumously conceived children and other illegitimate
children is that the natural parents in the first instance used assisted
163
reproductive technology to enable their pregnancies. This method

158. Cf. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2026−27 (2012) (“Under [Florida] law, . . . a child born posthumously may inherit through intestate succession only if
conceived during the decedent’s lifetime.”).
159. See infra Part IV.A.1.
160. See infra Part IV.A.2.
161. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 457, 461–64 (1988) (addressing the rights of a
minor child born out of wedlock as an illegitimate child); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co.,
406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.”); see also Paula
A. Monopoli, Nonmarital Children and Post-Death Parentage: A Different Path for Inheritance
Law?, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 857, 857 & n.4 (2008) (referring to children born out of
wedlock and explaining that “[t]he law has evolved from using the term ‘bastard’ for such
children to using the phrase ‘illegitimate,’ then to ‘out-of-wedlock,’ and most recently
‘nonmarital.’”).
162. See Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033 (indicating such a distinction by stating that “[n]o
showing has been made that posthumously conceived children share the characteristics
that prompted our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children of unwed parents.”).
163. See Gloria J. Banks, Traditional Concepts and Nontraditional Conceptions: Social Security
Survivor’s Benefits for Posthumously Conceived Children, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 263 (1999)
(“Posthumously conceived children are a newly created class of nonmarital children [who]
are conceived by nonconventional reproductive techniques . . . .”); Goodwin, supra note
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of conception, however, makes posthumously conceived children no
164
less illegitimate under the law.
A “legitimate child” is a child (1) “conceived or born in lawful
wedlock” or (2) “legitimated by the parents’ later marriage or by a
165
declaration or judgment of legitimation.” Posthumously conceived
children do not satisfy the first part of the definition because in most
166
In
states, a marriage ends upon the death of one of the spouses.
addition, a posthumously conceived child cannot be legitimated by a
167
deceased parent. It then follows that posthumously conceived children cannot be “legitimate.” Many state intestacy laws, including the
Florida laws relied on in Capato, recognize this, and therefore treat
168
posthumously conceived children as illegitimate under the law.

121, at 241, 254, 271 (noting that, historically, non-marital children were considered “children of no one”; that current law generally states that if a child is not born within ten
months of the death of the father, the child is considered illegitimate; and that “posthumously conceived children are a class of non-marital children”); Christopher A. Scharman,
Note, Not Without My Father: The Legal Status of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1001, 1044 (2002) (“Nonmarital children and nonmarital posthumous children are
similarly situated as they are both indisputably the genetic offspring of the parent, differing only in the timing and circumstances of their birth.”).
164. Cf. Goodwin, supra note 121, at 271 (asserting that “posthumously conceived children are a class of non-marital children”); Scharman, supra note 163, at 1039 (noting that
“posthumous children are viewed as illegitimate”).
165. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 100 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
166. See Banks, supra note 163, at 262 (stating that “[p]osthumously conceived children
are de facto nonmarital children because their parents’ marital union dissolves at either
spouse’s death.”); Ellen J. Garside, Comment, Posthumous Progeny: A Proposed Resolution to
the Dilemma of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 41 LOY. L. REV. 713, 717 (1996) (“Marriage
dissolves at death.”).
167. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
168. Cf. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2030 (noting that a marriage ends when a spouse dies and
concluding that “the Capato twins . . . would not qualify as ‘marital’ children”); Woodward
v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 266–67 (Mass. 2002) (“[P]osthumously conceived
children are always nonmarital children. . . . [I]t follows that, under the intestacy statute,
posthumously conceived children must obtain a judgment of paternity as a necessary prerequisite to enjoying inheritance rights in the estate of the deceased genetic father.”).
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2. Posthumously Conceived Children Do Share the Characteristics
and Stigma of Illegitimate Children
While recognizing that in both instances—being born out of
wedlock and being posthumously conceived—the child is not at fault,
the Capato Court reasoned that there was “[n]o showing . . . that
posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that
prompted [the Court’s] skepticism of classifications disadvantaging
169
children of unwed parents.” The Court, however, failed to fully ex170
Previously, the Court’s raplain what these characteristics are.
tionale for applying intermediate scrutiny to illegitimacy-based classifications was that it was unfair to punish children for the conduct of
171
their parents. This rationale did not stem from a showing that the
parents acted immorally; rather, it developed because society sought
172
to punish what it considered or thought was immoral.
There is ample evidentiary support for believing that posthumously conceived children are or will be subjected to the same stigma
that other illegitimate children have traditionally faced and that,
therefore, grouping posthumously conceived children with other illegitimate children is justified. First, society cannot distinguish between
these illegitimate children because the difference is not noticeable to
173
the public. In Mathews, the Court suggested that illegitimate children have an immutable characteristic—the circumstances of their
174
birth. Just like the “traditional” illegitimate children who were born

169. Capato, 132 S. Ct. at 2033.
170. The Court did acknowledge that it applies intermediate scrutiny when faced with
challenges to laws that burden “‘illegitimate children for the sake of punishing the illicit
relations of their parents.’” Id. (citation omitted).
171. See e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762,
769–70 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417
U.S. 628, 631–32 (1974); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972).
172. See, e.g., Weber, 406 U.S. at 175 (“The status of illegitimacy has expressed through
the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage.
But visiting this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust.”).
173. See Mathews, 427 U.S. at 506 (observing that “illegitimacy does not carry an obvious
badge”).
174. See id. at 505 (“It is true, of course, that the legal status of illegitimacy, however defined, is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the
control of the illegitimate individual . . . .”); see also Goodwin, supra note 121, at 245 n.76
(“Illegitimacy is immutable because children born out of wedlock cannot control the sta-
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out of wedlock while both parents were alive, posthumously conceived
175
Second,
children cannot control the circumstances of their birth.
to the average person, both sets of children may appear to consist of a
child with one parent, subjecting them to social rejection and stig176
Indeed, posthumously conceived children are the topic of
ma.
moral debates regarding whether posthumous conception should
177
even be allowed. Furthermore, similar to their earlier objections to
traditional illegitimate children in the era when illegitimate children
born to unwed mothers was less common, numerous religions now
178
find posthumous conception immoral and oppose the practice.
As a result, just like society relegated traditional illegitimate children to second-class status, posthumously conceived children are discriminated against by society, state intestacy laws, government agen179
Then in Capato, by failing to recognize that an
cies, and courts.

tus of their birth and cannot force their parents to legitimate them through subsequent
marriage.”).
175. Goodwin, supra note 121, at 272.
176. See, e.g., id. at 272–73 (“[P]osthumously conceived children share the same familial
circumstances as other non-marital children, by growing up outside the confines of a ‘traditional’ marital family. Therefore, posthumously conceived children may experience the
same social stigma as other non-marital children, especially if raised by single parents who
do not remarry.”).
177. See, e.g., Woodward v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 760 N.E.2d 257, 272 (Mass. 2002) (noting the “complex moral, legal, social, and ethical questions that surround [posthumously
conceived children’s] birth” will continue to increase); In re Estate of Kolacy, 753 A.2d
1257, 1263 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2000) (stating that “[t]here are . . . ethical problems,
social policy problems and legal problems which are presented when a child is brought
into existence under circumstances where a traditionally normal parenting situation is not
available. . . . The law should certainly be cautious about encouraging parents to move
precipitously in this area.”); see also Bonnie Steinbock, Sperm As Property, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y
REV. 57, 62 (1995) (“There are also moral arguments against treating sperm as property.
One such argument opposes posthumous reproduction, based on a desire to protect the
resulting offspring.”).
178. See, e.g., Cyrene Grothaus-Day, From Pipette to Cradle, from Immortality to Extinction, 7
RUTGERS J.L. & RELIGION ¶¶ 41, 44–51 (2005) (noting that “[t]he Catholic Church generally disapproves of [assisted reproductive technology] because it ‘separates the unitive
from the procreative aspect of the marital act’” and that “[t]he Lutheran Church is adamantly opposed to [posthumous conception]” (footnotes omitted)).
179. See Susan N. Gary, We Are Family: The Definition of Parent and Child for Succession Purposes, 34 ACTEC L.J. 171, 180–84 (2008) (discussing the different treatment for posthu-
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“illegitimate for one purpose but not for another” standard was being
applied to posthumously conceived children, the Supreme Court undermined the fundamental fairness emphasized by its prior hold180
ings.
B. The Capato Court Failed to Remand the Case to Determine Whether
Posthumously Conceived Children Have the Same Characteristics as
Traditional Illegitimate Children
Instead of discarding the equal protection argument, the Capato
Court should have remanded the case for a determination of whether
posthumously conceived children represent a different subcategory of
illegitimate children who are not entitled to intermediate scrutiny.
When a factual inquiry is essential to decide a constitutional question,
181
A rea court should ensure that it has a complete factual record.
mand is appropriate where there are important constitutional interests at stake, and the additional information is needed to resolve a
182
complex question.
In Capato, the district court did not evaluate whether posthumously conceived children should be considered illegitimate chil183
dren. The district court did not even use the term “illegitimate” in
conducting its abbreviated equal protection analysis. The Third Circuit did even less, dedicating only a footnote to its affirmance of the
184
The court failed to
district court’s equal protection conclusion.
consider whether posthumously conceived children should be pro-

mously conceived children in court cases and state statutes); see also supra notes 173–178
and accompanying text.
180. See supra text accompanying note 171.
181. Columbia Union Coll. v. Clarke, 159 F.3d 151, 168 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Particularly
when deciding difficult constitutional questions dependent on intensely factual determinations, as in the case at hand, a court must assure itself that it has before it a full and
complete factual record.”).
182. Cf. id. (noting instances in which the Supreme Court remanded cases involving
determinations of whether “an institution was ‘pervasively sectarian’” because of the lower
courts’ “diligence in holding lengthy evidentiary hearings and making numerous factual
findings”).
183. See generally Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Astrue, Civ. No. 08-5405 (DMC), 2010
WL 1076522 (D. N.J. Mar. 23, 2010), aff’d in part, vacated in part sub nom. Capato ex rel.
B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2011).
184. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., K.N.C. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 626, 628 n.1 (3d Cir.
2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
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tected as illegitimate children and made no inquiry or review of the
issues later identified in the Supreme Court opinion. The Supreme
Court then, unsurprisingly, found no evidence available on the
shared characteristics between posthumously conceived children and
other illegitimate children, an issue into which neither of the lower
185
courts had inquired.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court implied that evidence establishing that posthumously conceived children needed protection might
186
Because the district court is the aphave influenced its decision.
187
propriate place to hear evidence and make findings of fact, once
the Court identified an unexplored factual question, it should have
remanded the case to the lower court to determine whether posthumously conceived children are sufficiently similar to children born
188
out of wedlock to be similarly classified as illegitimate.
C. The Capato Court Erred by Applying Rational Basis Review
Unfortunately, with little explanation, the Capato Court wrongly
applied rational basis review, imposing a consequence on the Capato
189
twins based on the family planning of their parents. As a result, the
posthumously conceived Capato twins were doubly punished—first, in
the denial of benefits and, second, in the level of scrutiny used to
evaluate that denial. Regarding illegitimate children, heightened
scrutiny is appropriate where the policy or law in question indirectly
punishes the child through no fault of his own but instead punishes
190
the child because of the acts of his parents. While there is some in-

185. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
186. Cf. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012) (“No showing has
been made that posthumously conceived children share the characteristics that prompted
our skepticism of classifications disadvantaging children of unwed parents.”).
187. See supra notes 181–182 and accompanying text; see also Kennedy v. Silas Mason
Co., 334 U.S. 249, 257 (1948) (“We consider it the part of good judicial administration to
withhold decision of the ultimate questions involved in this case until this or another record shall present a more solid basis of findings based on litigation or on a comprehensive
statement of agreed facts. While we might be able, on the present record, to reach a conclusion that would decide the case, it might well be found later to be lacking in the thoroughness that should precede judgment of this importance and which it is the purpose of
the judicial process to provide.”).
188. See supra notes 181–182.
189. See supra text accompanying note 150.
190. See supra Part II.B.
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consistency regarding what level of scrutiny applies to such circum191
stances, scholars generally agree that laws discriminating on the ba192
Contrary to
sis of illegitimacy are subject to intermediate scrutiny.
the Supreme Court’s assertion in Capato, the two types of illegitimate
children—those posthumously conceived and those born out of wedlock—whose difference lies only in their method and timing of conception, are similarly situated and, thus, are both entitled to one of
the few protections that comes with a title of illegitimacy: receiving intermediate scrutiny in equal protection claims.
D. In Its Abbreviated Equal Protection Analysis, the Capato Court Erred
by Finding That the SSA’s Asserted Interests Were Legitimate and
Passed the Rational Basis Test
The Capato Court erred in affirming the SSA’s interpretation,
which invoked state intestacy law and accepted a state determination
of legitimacy in creating a presumption of dependency, without making an inquiry into the constitutionality of the state law the SSA ap193
plied. Further, the Court’s determination that the SSA’s interests in
using state intestacy law were legitimate was flawed and led to the in194
correct conclusion that the interpretation passed rational review.

191. Compare Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 463–65 (1988) (applying intermediate scrutiny and requiring a “substantial relation” between the classification and the government
interest); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769–72 (1977) (applying a heightened form of
scrutiny and noting that no legitimate state interest justified the classification); Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631–33 (1974) (same); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164, 172−74 (1972) (same), with Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505−06, 509 (1976) (applying an unclear level of scrutiny that required a reasonable, but not a substantial, relation between the classification and the government interest). For a criticism highlighting
the Court’s failure to explain the applicable level of scrutiny used in Mathews, see Mathews,
427 U.S. at 519–20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
192. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES
797–801 (4th ed. 2011) (“It is now clearly established that intermediate scrutiny is applied
in evaluating laws that discriminate against nonmarital children . . . .”); JOHN E. NOWAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 453–54 (3d ed. 2007) (“Under
the modern cases, the courts will uphold a governmental use of a classification based on
the status of a person having been ‘legitimate’ or ‘illegitimate’ at birth only if the classification is ‘substantially’ related to an ‘important’ government interest.”).
193. See infra Part IV.D.1.
194. See infra Part IV.D.2.
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1. The Court Failed to Determine the Purpose or Constitutionality of
the State Law That the SSA Applied
Under a rational basis analysis, a legitimate state interest must be
consistent with the Constitution. 195 The Capato Court wrongly allowed
the SSA to rely on a stated purpose of administrative convenience to
support its interpretation, while never considering the state’s reasons
196
Posthumously confor establishing the law in the first instance.
ceived children suffer a disparate impact regarding eligibility for survivor benefits because state intestacy laws determine legitimacy and
generally classify posthumously conceived children as illegitimate,
thereby denying these children a presumption of dependency under
197
the Act. Once a disparate impact is identified, a court should evaluate whether the state intestacy law shows any discriminatory intent or
198
purpose.
The Capato Court, however, only evaluated the constitutionality
199
It made no inquiry into the
of the “regime Congress adopted.”
purpose or constitutionality of the Florida law that the SSA applied.
The question, therefore, of whether the state statute purposefully
punished illegitimate children was never evaluated by the Supreme
Court and never considered by the SSA before giving the law federal
force in determinations of Social Security survivor benefits. A congressional statutory regime that allows the executive branch to give
force to a state law without regard to its constitutionality is an arbi-

195. See Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) (“[I]f the constitutional
concept of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least mean
that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a
legitimate governmental interest.”).
196. Cf. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 518–23 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (opining that the presumptions of dependency in the Act violated equal protection because
administrative convenience did not justify the overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness of
the classifications).
197. See Kindregan & McBrien, supra note 3, at 581, 586−87, 594 (highlighting the
general absence of state intestacy laws that protect the inheritance rights of posthumously
conceived children); see also Banks, supra note 163, at 259 (“[O]nly a few states have legislation addressing the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children. . . . Because
of the timing of the posthumously conceived child’s conception and birth, they are usually
unable to establish either of these dependency standards.” (footnotes omitted)).
198. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 192, at 686–87.
199. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012).
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200

trary use of authority.
Even though the Supreme Court and other
federal courts have identified some state statutes as discriminating
against illegitimate children, 201 the SSA Program Operations Manual
System (“POMS”) does not offer any guidance on what the SSA
should do when state statutes discriminate against illegitimate chil202
dren. Because the POMS contains no requirement that the underlying state statute be consistent with the Constitution, the SSA is al203
lowed to enforce potentially unconstitutional state statutes. Blindly
following state law, which is dispositive regarding whether posthumously conceived children can receive survivor benefits, makes little
sense either constitutionally or practically.

200. See REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., RSC POLICY BRIEF: CONGRESS’S ROLE AND
RESPONSIBILITY IN DETERMINING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LEGISLATION 1–2 (2012),
available

at

http://rsc.scalise.house.gov/uploadedfiles/the_role_and_responsibility_of_

congress_in_determing_constitutionality_of_legislation.pdf

(asserting

that

all

three

branches of government have the obligation to examine the constitutionality of the laws
they pass and enforce).
201. See, e.g., Reed v. Campbell, 476 U.S. 852, 852−53 (1986) (determining that a Texas
intestacy statute was unconstitutional); Picket v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 3−7 (1983) (determining that a Tennessee paternity suit and support statute was unconstitutional); Mills v.
Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 92–93, 99–100 (1982) (determining that a Texas paternity suit
and support statute was unconstitutional); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 763, 766
(1977) (determining that an Illinois intestacy statute was unconstitutional); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 536–38 (1973) (per curiam) (determining that a Texas paternity support
statute was unconstitutional); Daniels v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 1516, 1516–17, 1520–22 (11th
Cir. 1992) (determining that a Georgia intestacy statute was unconstitutional as applied
and interpreted by the SSA); Handley v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 999, 1000–01, 1003–04 (11th
Cir. 1983) (determining that an Alabama intestacy statute was unconstitutional as applied
to an illegitimate child).
202. See generally , Program Operations Manual System, GN 00306.075, State Laws on Legitimation and Inheritance Rights, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN., https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/
0200306075#b (last visited Mar. 7, 2013).
203. Cf. REPUBLICAN STUDY COMM., supra note 200, at 4 (“Inaction by Congress can
have the effect of validating unconstitutional actions. This inaction may then be followed
as precedent.”).
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2. Through Its Application of Rational Basis Review, the Capato
Court Erroneously Accepted the SSA’s Asserted Interests and
Unsurprisingly Found a Reasonable Relationship Between the
Means and the End
The Capato Court upheld the SSA’s action based on the “twin interests in [reserving] benefits [for] those children who have lost a
parent’s support, and in using reasonable presumptions to minimize
the administrative burden of proving dependency on a case-by-case
204
Part of the problem with the Court applying rational basis
basis.”
review is that these asserted government interests were accepted as
205
Under a proper intermediate scrutiny analysis, the asserted
true.
206
interests would have been open to the Court’s evaluation.
As to the SSA’s interest in “reserving benefits,” the Court should
have concluded that, in light of the Act’s humanitarian goals, the Act
207
Inwarrants a liberal construction in favor of providing benefits.
deed, in the past, Congress has expanded coverage of the Act to pro208
vide benefits for illegitimate children. Similar to the sentiment expressed in Jimenez, however, the Capato Court should not have
accepted the SSA’s reasoning without requiring the agency to provide
evidence to support the contention that the Capato twins, and other
209
posthumously conceived children, do not lose parental support.

204. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012) (alteration in original)
(citation omitted).
205. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 192, at 700–01 (explaining that under rational basis
review, the Court is deferential to the government’s asserted purpose regardless of whether the asserted purpose is the actual purpose) .
206. See id. at 687 (noting that intermediate scrutiny is less deferential to the government and explaining that the government has the burden of proof to demonstrate that its
asserted interest is an important objective).
207. See supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
208. See e.g., SSR 66-47, 1966 WL 3044 (Jan. 1, 1966) (noting the status of illegitimate
children under the Social Security Act Amendments of 1965 and how, in some cases, an
illegitimate child can be a “child” under the Act and can thus be entitled to benefits); SSR
67-59, 1967 WL 2995 (Jan. 1, 1967) (same); SSR 67-60, 1967 WL 2996 (Jan. 1, 1967)
(same).
209. See Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 633 (1974) (requiring “evidence [to]
support[] the contention that to allow illegitimates in the classification of appellants to
receive benefits would significantly impair” the ability of others to receive benefits); see also
Louise Weinberg, A General Theory of Governance: Due Process and Lawmaking Power, 54 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1057, 1112 (2013) (“The Capato children had lost a parent’s support.
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Again, had the Court applied intermediate scrutiny, the SSA would
210
Unfortunately, because the Court
have had this burden of proof.
applied highly deferential rational basis review, it opined that the
scheme must only be a reasonable means of accomplishing the assert211
ed goals, despite suggestions that the reasons and policy are both
212
underinclusive and overinclusive.
As to the SSA’s interest in administrative convenience, the Supreme Court has traditionally scrutinized the propriety of administrative efficiency as a legitimate goal when the consequence of the effi213
Illegitimate
ciency harms an otherwise helpless class of citizens.
That they would have been dependent on Robert, had he survived, was conceded—there
was no administrative burden in proving it.”).
210. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
211. Astrue v. Capato ex rel. B.N.C., 132 S. Ct. 2021, 2033 (2012).
212. See id. at 2032 (“[T]he intestacy criterion yields benefits to some children outside
the Act’s central concern.”); see also Banks, supra note 163, at 346 (“There are no viable
alternate considerations or means by which most posthumously conceived children can
secure their entitlement to survivor’s benefits [unless these children can inherit through
state intestacy law]. The statute as it stands is overinclusive in that children who may not
be actually dependent are presumed dependent, and underinclusive due to the total exclusion of after-conceived children who have no statutory opportunity in which to prove
dependency on a deceased parent.”). In Capato, if the Court applied intermediate scrutiny, it is unlikely that the Court would have found a substantial relation between the government interests and the classification because the underinclusiveness and overinclusiveness would likely not be tolerated. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 192, at 689–90 (explaining
that when evaluating the fit between the government’s purpose and the means used to
achieve that purpose, the stricter the level of scrutiny applied by the Court, the less tolerance there is for overinclusiveness and underinclusiveness).
213. See Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 519−20 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court’s acceptance of administrative convenience and noting that illegitimacybased classifications demand justification “by a weightier governmental interest than merely ‘administrative convenience’”); Banks, supra note 163, at 348−49 (asserting that because
of computer and Internet technology modernization since the Mathews decision in 1976,
there is great doubt as to whether the government interest of administrative convenience
“could substantiate the statutory exclusion of nonmarital, posthumously conceived children”); see also I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“[T]the fact that a given law or
procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government,
standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government . . . .”). But see Mathews, 427 U.S. at 509 (majority opinion) (stating that “[s]uch presumptions in aid of administrative functions, though they may approximate, rather than

2013]

ASTRUE v. CAPATO

1073

children are a class that has been historically discriminated against by
214
This
states in assigning intestacy rights and government benefits.
history was essentially ignored in Capato because the Capato twins’ illegitimacy—posthumous conception—was different than the traditional type of illegitimacy—conception and birth out of wedlock during the parents’ lifetimes. In Jimenez, however, the Court concluded
that the state cannot rely on a government interest in preventing spurious claims to deprive children of the opportunity to receive bene215
fits. The Jimenez Court found that where the state effectively “denies
[children] any opportunity to prove dependency,” the rationale can216
This sentiment was also
not be the prevention of spurious claims.
217
echoed by the three dissenters in Mathews. Finding no “relevant difference between Jimenez and [Mathews],” Justice Stevens stated:
In Jimenez the Secretary told the Court that the classification was “designed only to prevent spurious claims.” The
Court held that objective insufficient to justify “the blanket
and conclusive exclusion” of a subclass of illegitimates. The
statute has not changed but now we are told that the justification for a similar blanket and conclusive exclusion is “administrative convenience.” I suggest that this is merely a dif218
ferent name for the same federal interest.
Justice Stevens further reasoned that, like the government interest of
preventing spurious claims, the government interest of administrative
convenience should not be relied on as a rationale for depriving ille219
gitimate children the opportunity to prove dependency.
What the Capato Court failed to recognize was that, while the Act
provides additional ways for a child applicant to qualify for survivor
220
insurance benefits, posthumously conceived children are unable to

precisely mirror, the results that case-by-case adjudication would show, are permissible under the Fifth Amendment, so long as that lack of precise equivalence does not exceed the bounds of
substantiality tolerated by the applicable level of scrutiny” (emphasis added)).
214. See supra Parts IV.A.1–2.
215. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 635–37 (1974).
216. Id.
217. Mathews, 427 U.S. at 518−20, 523 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 518 (internal citations omitted).
219. See id. at 519 (“It seems rather plain . . . that . . . the classification is invalid unless it
is justified by a weightier governmental interest than merely ‘administrative convenience.’”).
220. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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221

meet any of those criteria. Indeed, the SSA and the Fourth Circuit
have explicitly recognized that posthumously conceived children cannot meet any of these additional requirements and are, therefore, totally excluded from obtaining survivor benefits unless they qualify un222
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court failed to
der state intestacy law.
notice this, and its decision in Capato allowed the exclusion of posthumously conceived children to perpetuate for the asserted purpose
of administrative convenience.
Arguably, even under rational basis review, the illegitimacy-based
classifications are not reasonably related to the administrative convenience of using state intestacy law to prevent case-by-case survivor benefits determinations. The SSA is actually set up to review benefits on a
223
Indeed, the SSA has its own legal staff, adminiscase-by-case basis.
224
trative law judges, and Appeals Council. In 2012, the SSA individually reviewed over five million retirement, survivorship, and Medicare
225
claims. Also in 2012, the SSA stated that it “has received more than
one hundred claims for survivor benefits by posthumously conceived

221. See Banks, supra note 163, at 346 (“There are no viable alternate considerations or
means by which most posthumously conceived children can secure their entitlement to
survivor’s benefits.”).
222. Schafer v. Astrue, 641 F.3d 49, 53 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The insured parent of such a
[posthumously conceived] child by definition died prior to the child’s conception, and
therefore parentage could not have been acknowledged or decreed prior to death, nor
could the applicant have been living with or receiving contributions from the decedent
when the decedent passed away.”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2680 (2012). The SSA has stated
that “[t]hese additional tests for eligibility require action by the insured during the lifetime of the child.” SSAR 05-1(9), 70 Fed. Reg. 55,656, 55,657 n.3 (Sept. 22, 2005).
223. See Survivor’s Planner: How You Apply for Survivor’s Benefits, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.,
http://www.ssa.gov/survivorplan/howtoapply.htm#ht=1 (last visited Feb. 5, 2013) (detailing the individual information and documents needed to apply for survivor benefits and
noting that “[s]ince every person’s situation is different, you cannot apply for survivors
benefits online”); see generally SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN., ONLINE SOCIAL SECURITY
HANDBOOK (2012), available at http://ssa.gov/OP_Home/handbook/handbook.html
(explaining the process for filing claims with the SSA).
224. Organizational Structure of the Social Security Administration, SOC. SECURITY ADMIN.
(2012), available at http://www.ssa.gov/org/ssachart.pdf.
225. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMIN. PERFORMANCE SECTION, SSA’S FY 2012 PERFORMANCE
AND

ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 73 (2012), available at http://www.socialsecurity.gov/

finance/2012/Complete%20Performance%20Section.pdf.
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children, with claims increasing significantly in recent years.”
Assuming that there were 100 child survivor claims from posthumously
conceived children in 2012 alone, these numbers indicate that only
about .002%, or 100 out of 5,000,000, of the claims are from posthumously conceived children seeking survivor benefits. If, however, the
cumulative total of child survivor claims is 100, then the percentage of
SSA survivor benefits claims from posthumously conceived children is
even lower. Given these figures, one must wonder whether it would
really be that administratively inconvenient for these claims to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Probably not. It is therefore difficult
to find a reasonable relationship between the means and the end. To
be sure, scholars have begun to find the Court’s reasoning in Capato
227
If the Capato Court had
“an offense to justice as well as reason.”
been presented with this information, perhaps it would have found
that, even under the rational basis test, the government’s contention
lacked merit. Moreover, if the Court had properly applied intermediate scrutiny, then the SSA’s use of state intestacy law would fail an
equal protection analysis because even if the asserted government interests were found to be important, they are not substantially related to
achieving the purpose of administrative convenience.
V. CONCLUSION
In Astrue v. Capato, the Supreme Court addressed the SSA’s illegitimacy-based classification and use of state intestacy law in determining whether posthumously conceived children are eligible for Social
228
Security survivor benefits. In determining that the SSA’s use of state
intestacy law was consistent with the statute’s textual meaning and
229
purpose and was entitled only to rational basis review, the Supreme
Court demonstrated that it has not yet accepted posthumously conceived children as deserving of the protection of other illegitimate

226. James Vicini, U.S. Top Court Decides In Vitro Fertilization Benefits, REUTERS, May 21,
2012, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/21/us-usa-socialsecurity-benefits-idUSBR
E84K0SD20120521.
227. Weinberg, supra note 209, at 1113; see also id. at 1112 (“[I]t is hard to see why discrimination against a subclass of posthumously born infants is more justifiable than discrimination against all posthumously born infants, when the subclass has no rational relation to the child. No amount of creative subclassing can save Astrue [v. Capato, 132 S. Ct.
2021 (2012)] from its denial of equal protection.”).
228. See supra Part III.
229. See supra notes 127−128, 149−150 and accompanying text.
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children, even though both sets of children are unfairly impacted because of the decisions of their parents.
Instead of protecting the rights of these innocent children, the
Court’s equal protection review mistakenly used a highly deferential
rational basis test that failed to honor its precedent and improperly
allowed a federal agency to enforce state laws without regard to those
230
If the Court believed that posthumously
laws’ constitutionality.
conceived children may not qualify as illegitimate children under the
law, then the Court should have remanded the case to the district
court to allow the parties to present evidence on whether these children are a different subcategory of illegitimate children not entitled
231
Ultimately, the Court should have applied
to heightened scrutiny.
232
intermediate scrutiny, but it should not have been so easily persuaded that the SSA’s asserted purposes were legitimate, even under
233
the rational basis test. Until the Supreme Court honors the precedent of its own jurisprudence and applies intermediate scrutiny to
these discriminatory classifications, posthumously conceived children
will continue to be regarded as second-class citizens and denied equal
protection for reasons beyond their control.

230. See supra Part IV.A, D.1.
231. See supra Part IV.B.
232. See supra Part IV.C.
233. See supra Part IV.D.

